1958-2025 (Quick summary)
Ayub Khan (1958–1969):
No formal amendments to the 1973 Constitution (it did not yet exist). Ayub replaced the 1956 constitution with a new 1962 Constitution (and used orders such as the Basic
Democracies Order) — a major constitutional change, but not a numbered amendment to the 1973 text.
Yahya Khan (1969–1971):
No formal amendments to the 1973 Constitution either; he abrogated the 1962 Constitution and ran the country by martial-law instruments and the Legal Framework Order (1970) that set the stage for the 1973 Constitution.
Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988):
At least two numbered amendments to the (later) 1973 Constitution were enacted while Zia was in power or as part of the restoration process he controlled — the 8th Amendment (1985) is the most important (it shifted power to the President); the 10th Amendment (1987) was also passed in his era.
More broadly, Zia issued many constitutional orders/changes (some analyses count dozens of alterations made under his rule).
Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008):
One major formal amendment that directly consolidated Musharraf’s changes: the 17th Amendment (2003) (this largely incorporated Musharraf’s 2002 Legal Framework Order into the constitution). Musharraf also ruled by LFOs (2002) and other orders which were later regularized. Bottom line on counting:
If you count formal, numbered amendments to the 1973 Constitution enacted by Parliament during each ruler’s tenure, then:
Ayub — 0 (but promulgated a whole new 1962 Constitution and many orders).
Yahya — 0 (but issued the 1970 LFO and ran by martial law).
Zia — 2 (notably the 8th and 10th as formal amendments passed while his influence dominated).
Musharraf — 1 (the 17th).
(If you include constitutional orders / legal framework orders / provisional constitutional orders / executive fiat that changed constitutional practice — then the counts and effect are much larger for Ayub, Zia and Musharraf. Many authors therefore say
“Zia introduced dozens of constitutional changes” and Musharraf produced many LFO-based changes later regularized by the 17th Amendment.)
Who benefitted — short analysis
Ayub Khan (1962 Constitution / Basic Democracies): the architecture favoured a strong presidency and centralized executive authority.
Beneficiaries: the President/central state (and therefore the ruling establishment).
The system reduced parliamentary checks.
Yahya Khan (LFO 1970 / martial law): beneficiaries were the military/centre — he used LFOs and martial law to control the political transition (and postpone/shape the constitution-making process).
Zia ul-Haq: the 8th Amendment
explicitly expanded presidential powers (e.g. powers to dissolve assemblies, and other safeguards that weakened parliamentary
supremacy).
Beneficiaries: the President (and the military/establishment); costs included weakened parliamentary/judicial checks and added Islamization elements.
Zia’s many orders also embedded Islamization and executive strength.
Pervez Musharraf: the 17th Amendment largely ratified and regularized Musharraf’s LFO of 2002 — it gave constitutional cover to many of his powers (e.g., validated changes he had made, provisions on the President’s powers and on holding offices). Beneficiary: Musharraf personally and the institutional presidency/military that backed him; critics said it weakened parliamentary supremacy and judicial independence.
Important nuance: many of the military-era changes were later reversed or modified by civilian parliaments (for example, the 18th Amendment (2010) reversed several presidential accretions of power and restored provincial autonomy). So “beneficiary” can be temporary (concentrated in the presidency/establishment while a dictator or his allies held power) but later partially rolled back by democratically enacted amendments.
The 26th and 27th Amendments —
what they do and who benefited 26th Amendment
(passed Oct 20–21, 2024)
What it changed (high level): a package of 27 clauses affecting judicial appointments, the role of the Judicial Commission and a new parliamentary Special Committee role in
selecting the Chief Justice; a cap on the Chief Justice’s term; removal/limitation of the Supreme Court’s suo motu powers in favour of other procedures; and a new constitutional right to a healthy environment (Article 9A) among other procedural and judicial changes. (Text and reporting list the package and specific changes.)
Beneficiaries: Critics (human-rights groups, many jurists) say the executive and the ruling coalition benefit because the amendment increases parliamentary/executive influence over senior judicial
appointments and limits judicial oversight; supporters claim it increases accountability and parliamentary oversight. On balance the most-cited effect in reporting is reduction in judicial independence and greater control by political actors (and thereby a short-term benefit to those political actors).
27th Amendment (Nov 2025 — major structural change)
What reporting (Nov 2025) says: the 27th Amendment (as reported) would rewrite military chain-of-command language and create a new constitutional arrangement elevating a specific military leader (reported as Field Marshal Asim Munir in the coverage) and also create a new constitutional court while curbing some powers of the Supreme Court. This is a sweeping structural change reported in November 2025.
(This is breaking/developing coverage and remains controversial.)
Beneficiaries: based on the reporting and analysis, the military / establishment and the current political actors supporting the amendment are the immediate beneficiaries — it constitutionalizes a stronger role for the military command and reduces judicial constraints. Critics see it as shifting the balance toward the armed forces and away from independent judicial review.
Final words.
On beneficiaries: the recurring pattern in Pakistan’s history is that military rulers and the institutions that support them benefit most from constitutional orders and early amendments that expand executive/presidential power; later civilian parliaments sometimes reverse or dilute those changes (for example, the 18th Amendment in 2010 reversed many prior presidential accretions).
Sources: Wikipedia, Dawn, The Guardian, AI, Constitution Net.
