Does Pakistan really need Uncle Sam?

The relationship is necessary but dependency is not. Pakistan must be a party to the terms of engagement, but should not promise what it cannot deliver for fear of losing aid.
By: Touqir Hussain, dawn.com
Writing about US-Pakistan relations is always like writing a piece of literary criticism of Shakespeare’s Hamlet — looking for new answers to old nagging questions, falling short and often ending up with new questions. The challenging new question now is: Will Pakistan have to choose between the US and China in view of their intensifying rivalry? Pakistan’s anxiety is a reflection of its dependent foreign policy that cannot afford to lose any major relationship, yet cannot find the right mix. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar hinted as much in her remarks, as revealed in the Discord leaks reported by the Washington Post, that Pakistan can “no longer try to maintain a middle ground between China and the United States”. In a more recent statement, the Foreign Office spokesperson also said that Pakistan has not joined the “China block”. Navigating between the two relationships is not going to be an easy path. So the question is, if Pakistan has the option to keep relations with both China and the US, how much should the share of each be? The answer can only be provided by a correct understanding of both Pak-China and Pak-US relationships, their relevance and their importance to Pakistan’s national interests.
A relationship lacking consensus
While there is largely a national consensus on the strategic nature of relations with China, the same is not true of US-Pakistan relations. The understanding of relations with the US is marked by long-held myths and misperceptions that have hindered a clear-eyed view. This article hopes to address some of these misconceptions.
For over six decades, US-Pakistan relations have served vital interests for the two countries but it has not been a ‘normal’ bilateral relationship. Its central irony is that substantial aid levels from time to time have not reflected an enduring and substantive relationship. Instead, it has fluctuated back and forth from close alliance to estrangement and antipathy…
Myths surrounding the relationship
The first engagement from the mid 1950s-60s was the last time the US really helped the people of Pakistan. After that, the relationship was largely between the two ruling establishments in Washington and Islamabad who had stake in it for different reasons and purposes. In the next two engagements — during the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan and their post-9/11 alliance — the question for Washington was not what kind of relationship it should have with Pakistan but what kind of role it wanted it to play for a particular geopolitical or security need. More importantly, what it would take to make the regime do what the US wanted it to do. That is what determined aid levels, not what intrinsic importance Pakistan had or did not have…
From myths to misperceptions
All this created serious problems in knowing the truth about the relationship in both countries. The public was conflicted between their own reservations about the relationship and the inflated image painted by the governments. In the US, the political and military leaderships came to believe in their own propaganda and felt let down when they found Pakistan falling short of its exaggerated image as an ally.
Washington was not happy with Pakistan’s relations with China, the 1965 war, Islamabad’s nuclear programme, and Pakistan’s contribution to the failure of the Afghanistan war.   And there were cries of betrayal.